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Book. Reviews

OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. By F. Hodge
O'Neal.* Callaghan & Company, Chicago, Illinois. 1975. Pp. 647.
$42.50. Reviewed by John J. Ghingher, III.
Because of its uniqueness among the various business forms
employed in American commerce, the closely held corporation confronts the corporate attorney with perhaps his most difficult challenge. More like a partnership in the mode of its daily operations,
yet clothed with the formality of corporate status to the same
extent as public corporations, the close corporation is a hybrid of
sorts. In spite of its common usage, it receives a surprisingly
small amount of specific attention in the corporate statutes, and
many of the solutions and protections offered by those statutes
appear ill-suited to its particular needs. As a result, close corporations enjoy little of the legal flexibility inherent in the legislation
governing partnerships, but produce problems which cannot be
resolved properly by the more formal approaches offered by most
corporate statutes.
In Oppression of Minority Shareholders, Professor O'Neal has
focused once again on the special realities of the close corporation,"
this time illustrating in exhaustive fashion the plight of those who
find themselves holding a minority interest in such a corporation
with the majority interests aligned against them. As pointed out
in great detail, minority shareholders can be subjected to a number
of techniques, unique to the close corporation context, which, when
employed by the unfriendly majority, can result in the depletion
of the value of the minority interest, a denial of participation in
corporate prosperity, and, sometimes, eventual defeat or surrender
in the form of a constrained sale of shares at less than their true
value. Professor O'Neal's shorthand for the use of these majority
weapons is the term "squeeze-out," which he employs to describe
not only those actions which are specifically designed to eliminate
minority shareholders, but also those oppressive actions which may
fall short of complete elimination.
The major theme of this book is the author's conviction that
the courts generally have not kept abreast of the times in their
consideration of the rights and remedies of minority shareholders.
He suggests that the courts' execessive reliance on the principle
of majority control2 and the business judgment rules has too often
* James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.

t Associate, Weinberg &Green, Baltimore, Maryland.

1. See F. O'NA L, CLOSE- CoRPORATIoNs: LAW AND PRAciCE (1971).

2. The principle of majority control expresses the judicial rule that the majority of a
corporation's shareholders has the right to manage its affairs so long as they operate within the corporation's chartered powers and the provisions of corporate law.
3. The business judgment rule provides that a corporation's directors have full discretion to determine business policy and to conduct the affairs of the corporation.
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obscured the legitimate claims of minority shareholders whose
interests have suffered at the hands of the majority. The author
believes that, by awarding relief only where majority conduct is
clearly fraudulent or in bad faith, the courts have neglected to
redress situations in which the minority has been dealt with unfairly. He points out that some courts abdicate their equitable
responsibilities altogether when majority action triggers the dissenting shareholders' statutory right to have their shares judicially
appraised and liquidated.
Professor O'Neal is undoubtedly accurate in his conclusion that
the plight of minority shareholders deserves more aggressive judicial attention. He is equally correct when he observes that most
corporate statutes do not provide the courts with sufficient guidance
and flexibility in dealing with arbitrary majority conduct. However, conflicts between majority and minority shareholders of
closely held corporations involve numerous complexities which are
not subject to easy judicial or statutory formulae. These complexities are apparent from Professor O'Neal's highly detailed
illustration of the diverse origins of squeeze-outs and the myriad
squeeze-out techniques employed by majorities, but his less detailed
suggestions for ameliorative legislation highlight the true difficulty
of reaching any general solution to these complex problems.
The fundamental difficulty in reaching fair judicial or legislative solutions to squeeze-out situations arises primarily in gray
areas where the line between the interests of the corporation and
those of the minority shareholders is hazy and hard to discern.
For example, one squeeze-out technique mentioned by the author
is the dismissal of a minority shareholder as an employee of the
corporation. Dismissal would certainly be proper if it arose from
the minority shareholder's defipiencies as an employee, but dismissal merely to impose financial hardship on that shareholder,
perhaps to pave the way for a bargain redemption, should create
a cause of action appropriate for judicial remedy. Unfortunately,
however, the situations are rarely so clear cut; in most cases, the
majority shareholders will be able to assert cogent arguments that
the dismissal was in the best interests of the corporation, while
t he minority shareholder will bring to bear equally believable
claims of majority oppression. Subjective questions such as these
do not submit readily to objective judicial and legislative standards
and do not lend themselves to resolution by sweeping legislative
proposals.
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Another gray area exists with respect to the technique of withholding dividends, which Professor O'Neal places high on his list
of squeeze-out methodology. The author goes so far as to suggest
that the enactment of mandatory dividend legislation, permitting
minority shareholders to require payment of dividends in the absence of concrete evidence that all earnings must be retained for
business purposes, would be supported by "sound policy considerations." There are several basic problems with this proposal which
Professor O'Neal fails to note. First, there is no general objective
standard by which to measure the amount of working capital
required by a small business. Most closely held corporations are
under-capitalized initially and suffer from tight cash flows throughout their existences. It is rare that such a corporation will be able
to accumulate large cash surpluses for the payment of dividends.
Consequently, management in most cases will be able to present
persuasive arguments that all earnings must be retained for working capital needs. In addition, a statute mandating payment of
dividends would require courts to determine whether excess accumulations should be paid out as dividends, as demanded by minority
interests, or used to further expand the corporation's business, as
recommended by management. It is the reluctance of the courts
to make these difficult subjective judgments that has led them to
fall back on the traditional business judgment rule.
Still another problem arises from the income tax implications
of a mandatory dividend. The cardinal principle of tax planning
for close corporations is that dividends are to be avoided at all
costs. Rather than subject corporate earnings to the dreaded twolevel tax which results from dividends, most small corporations
choose to reward their shareholders in the form of deductible
salaries and corporate fringe benefits. Investors who voluntarily
participate in such corporations as silent partners normally do so
with full awareness that, because of the tax structure, their return
on investment will come through appreciation in the value of their
stock rather than through a steady stream of dividends. Such
investors may even prefer to forego dividends when the applicable
corporate and individual income tax brackets would siphon off
considerably more than half of each original earnings dollar. Of
course, as the author points out, there are many situations in which
minority shareholders find themselves as involuntary silent partners, without the employment relationship necessary to produce
income from the corporation in tax deductible form. Situations
such as this can arise, for example, from the inheritance of stock
or from a termination of employment. Even in these situations
there may be a substantial question whether the minority shareholder should be permitted to force the majority shareholders to
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accept double-taxed dividends by exercising his rights under a
mandatory dividend statute.
Solutions do not come easily to the subjective problems inherent
in disputes between majority and minority shareholders in the
close corporation context, and the only real weakness in this book
stems from the author's attempts to advocate guidelines for statutory reform in this difficult area. Professor O'Neal has, however,
exhaustively explored the various situations that create potential
squeeze-outs and the numerous techniques at the disposal of an
aggressive majority bent upon eliminating minority shareholders.
His illustrations of these situations and techniques are both imaginative and well-documented, and will be of great value to attorneys
who are faced with, or hope to avoid, squeeze-out problems. Unfortunately, the organization of the book into short, choppy subsections and the author's extensive footnoting, although helpful
from a reference standpoint, make the book less readable and tend
to interrupt the continuity of the author's theme.
These deficiencies become less important, however, in light of
what this reviewer believes to be the real value of this book, that
is, the stimulation of a new awareness among practicing corporate
lawyers of the serious implications of majority-minority relationships and the precautions which can be taken to prevent these
relationships from deteriorating into squeeze-out situations.

